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Abstract

This study integrates research on managerial discretion within the behavioral theory of the firm to examine how
four CEO psychological traits serving as antecedents of managerial discretion—ambiguity tolerance, cognitive
complexity, locus of control, and commitment to the status quo—moderate firm responses to poor performance.
Using CEOs’ responses to questionnaires, CEO ambiguity tolerance is found to positively moderate the
relationship between negative attainment discrepancy and strategic change when performance is slightly below
aspirations, defined as average market return for the firm’s industry. Further, CEOs with greater cognitive

complexity are found to engage in more strategic change when performance is farther below aspirations. Thus,
this study begins to unpack the role of CEOs’ cognitive makeup on firm responses to performance shortfalls.
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Introduction
One of the key theories in strategic management that focuses on firm risk taking and strategic change is the
behavioral theory of the firm (BTOF) (Cyert and March, 1963). At its core, it is a theory of performance feedback
that serves as an important driver of managerial decisions. In particular, managers assess their firm’s
performance relative to a predetermined aspiration level and act accordingly. When current performance falls
below aspirations, managers are faced with a negative attainment discrepancy and begin problemistic search for
solutions to close the performance gap (Bromiley, 1991; Greve, 2003). As performance further deteriorates,
managers are more likely to deviate from the status quo and undertake strategic change with the hopes of
bringing the firm back to its predetermined aspiration levels. There is ample evidence from prior research that
negative attainment discrepancy encourages various risky activities, such as research and development (R&D)
initiatives (Greve, 2003), partnership ties (Shipilov et al., 2011), foreign market entry (Shapira, 2017), and risk
taking (Lim and McCann, 2014).
An implicit assumption in performance feedback research has been that poor performance automatically drives
strategic change and scholars have almost taken it for granted that performance below aspirations is sufficient
to trigger a firm response. As a result, managers have been viewed as equally capable of responding to negative
attainment discrepancy and their role in performance feedback has been overlooked. However, such an
approach conflicts with the managerial discretion literature which posits that managers differ in their level of
control over conceiving, deliberating, planning, and implementing strategic actions (Hambrick and Finkelstein,
1987). With greater discretion, managers are more able to recognize the need for change and implement the
necessary actions for such change (see Wangrow et al., 2015, for review).
To address this gap in performance feedback research—that managers differ in their ability to pursue strategic
change in response to poor performance—this study integrates managerial discretion theorizing with the BTOF.
To that end, this study is designed to examine how the four psychological traits (i.e. ambiguity
tolerance, cognitive complexity, locus of control, and commitment to the status quo (CSQ)) identified
by Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) to impact managerial discretion affect his or her ability to implement
strategic actions in response to poor performance. Examining the moderating effects of these four psychological
traits goes beyond the traditional use of demographic indicators and addresses the call to peer into the real
psychological processes that drive executive behavior (see Hambrick, 2007; Lawrence, 1997).
This study seeks to make several contributions. First, integrating managerial discretion into the BTOF and
examining the impact of CEO psychological traits on firm responses to performance cues address a relatively
overlooked element in performance feedback research—the role of the executive in driving strategic change
following poor performance. Thus, this study responds to calls for greater attention to the human element in
BTOF research and its essential role in firm responses to performance cues (Gavetti et al., 2007). The second
contribution is extending the BTOF towards a contingency view of performance feedback. While studies have
examined how industry-level (Wiklund and Shepherd, 2003) and firm-level factors (Audia and Greve, 2006; Lim
and McCann, 2014) moderate the relationship between poor performance and strategic change, this study
focuses on characteristics residing at the individual level of analysis. Third, by examining the moderating effects
of four important psychological traits on the relationship between poor performance and strategic change,

managerial discretion research is extended into the “black box” of executive behavior. In doing so, this study
considers not only how these psychological traits influence strategic responses to poor performance, but which
traits may be associated with more rapid responses when performance falls just below aspirations and which
traits may be associated with more extensive strategic change when performance is far below aspirations.

Literature review and development of hypotheses
Researchers have argued that organizations in uncertain environments respond by making decisions based on
their prior history (Cyert and March, 1963; Levitt and March, 1988). This has led to an interest in how
organizational characteristics and history determine the likelihood of strategic change under conditions of
uncertainty (Levinthal and March, 1993; Miller and Chen, 1994; Greve, 2003). Cyert and March’s
(1963) influential BTOF was one of the first theoretical underpinnings to make predictions on when
organizations are likely to make changes. A primary tenet of BTOF is problemistic search, which is initiated when
the organization performs poorly and, thus, makes change more likely. In essence, the theory argues that poor
performance serves as a catalyst to search for solutions and stimulates managers to break away from
established organizational routines (Bromiley, 2005). As performance falls farther below aspiration levels, firms
are faced with a greater necessity to undertake strategic change that could address performance shortfalls. For
example, Greve (2003) finds that when performance falls below aspirations, firms are more likely to pursue R&D
activities. Similarly, Baum and colleagues (2005) provide further support by showing that poor performance
triggers the search for new partnerships in the banking industry. Other studies have also found that negative
attainment discrepancy results in more strategic change in the form of risk taking (Lim and McCann, 2014),
foreign market entry (Ref and Shapira, 2017), and divestitures (Kuusela et al., 2017). Consistent with these
studies, a baseline hypothesis associated with negative attainment discrepancy and strategic change is
developed. Formally stated:
Baseline hypothesis: Negative attainment discrepancy leads to greater strategic change.
Strategic change is fundamental in aligning the firm with its environment (Andrews, 1971) and represents a
major source of firm survival (Carpenter, 2000), but it is also inherently uncertain and complex. Thus, its
implementation is dependent on how executives perceive strategic change and whether they view it as a viable
means to address their firm’s problems. Prior research in the BTOF tradition has primarily focused on how
negative attainment discrepancy impacts strategic change but pays little attention to the role of firm executives
in that process, as well as whether executives with various cognitions, experiences, and risk preferences respond
differently to poor performance. Examining the role of executives’ psychological traits in the relationship
between performance and action addresses this omission in prior research. Indeed, according to Gavetti et al.,
(2007: 10) “the recent and growing movement in strategy research…pursues an agenda in which the construct
of cognitive representation plays a pivotal role.”
While the basic argument in this study is developed from the premise that executives respond to performance
shortfalls, it is rather simplistic to expect a similar response by all executives. Prior research has shown that not
all executives have the same level of discretion to pursue strategic choices and, thus, have latitudes of action
that can vary greatly (e.g. Crossland et al., 2014; Hambrick and Abrahamson, 1995; Key, 2002). Hambrick and
Finkelstein asserted that managerial discretion is determined by three forces: the task environment, the internal
firm context, and the executive’s personal characteristics. For example, scholars have found that greater
industry growth, munificence, and dynamism lead to greater managerial discretion (Hambrick and Abrahamson,
1995). In contrast, more industry regulation and concentration limit the latitude of action available to firm
executives (Porter, 1980; Thompson, 1967). Furthermore, theory and prior evidence suggest that while larger,
older, and more capital-intensive firms restrict managerial discretion (Hambrick and Macmillan, 1985; Hannan

and Freeman, 1977), greater firm resources and organizational slack serve to enhance executives’ latitude of
action (Barker and Duhaime, 1997; Cyert and March, 1963).
There are several reasons for examining executives’ individual characteristics that affect managerial discretion.
First, a greater understanding of the role of the human element in firm responses to performance cues is
needed. Upper echelons theory holds that top managers, based on their own set of cognitions and experiences,
make choices and decisions that shape a firm’s competitive posture (Carpenter, 2002; Hambrick and Mason,
1984). Hence, their cognitive makeup will also play a role in implementing strategic change. Focusing on these
individual-level characteristics, rather than industry-level or organizational-level characteristics, enables a look
into the remaining black box in current theoretical models. In addition, there has been a lack of agreement on
the measurement and construct validity of managerial discretion when generalizations about the task
environment or internal organization are used to measure managerial discretion (c.f. Wangrow et al., 2015). This
study avoids such issues by relying directly on observable and validated measures of the four psychological traits
posited by Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) to serve as antecedents of managerial discretion. Furthermore,
focusing on individual characteristics that determine managerial discretion facilitates a more intimate
examination of executives’ cognitions and behaviors when faced with performance shortfalls in their firms
(e.g. Hambrick et al., 2005).
The model developed in this study focuses on the moderating effects of four important and minimally examined
individual traits on the relationship of negative attainment discrepancy and strategic change. Consistent with
the psychology literature on ambiguity tolerance (see Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949; McLain, 2009), CEOs who tolerate
ambiguity are expected to be more proactive and open to experimentation, suggesting that they would drive
more immediate change in response to poor performance. Similarly, CEOs who possess greater cognitive
complexity are expected to comprehend and integrate more frameworks when making decisions (McGill et al.,
1994; Van Seggelen-Damen, 2013) and be better equipped to adapt to environmental changes (Bogner and Barr,
2000). Thus, when necessary, CEOs with greater cognitive complexity are expected to drive broader and more
extensive strategic change. Additionally, CEOs with a more internal locus of control (see Hodgkinson,
1992; Rotter, 1966) are expected to feel that their decisions and actions have a greater impact on reversing poor
performance than CEOs with a more external locus of control (Judge et al., 1999) and, thus, are expected to
drive greater strategic change following performance shortfalls. Finally, CEOs who are committed to the status
quo, embodied in psychological investments to the current state of affairs (Hambrick et al., 1993; Musteen et al.,
2006), are expected to be reluctant to initiate and promote strategic change when performance is below
aspirations.

Ambiguity tolerance and firm responses to performance shortfalls

The ambiguity tolerance construct developed by Frenkel-Brunswick (1949) contains many behavioral traits
associated with proactive behavior, including the ability to reverse decisions and courses of action when
conditions vary, the avoidance of prematurely selecting solutions in unclear situations, and an open-mindedness
toward unfamiliar and unexpected environmental changes (Furnham and Marks, 2013; McLain, 2009). Budner
(1962) defined ambiguity tolerance as an individual’s propensity to view ambiguous situations as
nonthreatening and desirable, suggesting that ambiguous situations can be novel (i.e. situations with no familiar
patterns) or complex (i.e. overly complex situations with too many patterns). A person with greater ambiguity
tolerance perceives uncertain and complex situations as interesting and exciting, tends to think creatively, and
approaches problems proactively with innovative perspectives (McLain, 2009).
Researchers have previously linked ambiguity tolerance with the ability to simultaneously manage multiple
frameworks, arguing that the ability to do so encourages strategic thinking and improves overall decisionmaking (Bonn, 2005; Starbuck and Milliken, 1988). Additionally, Graetz’s (2002) study of a firm’s future leaders

found that ambiguity tolerance was associated with the abilities to conceptualize a variety of ideas and
synthesize proposals from multiple perspectives.
From theory and prior research, CEOs with greater ambiguity tolerance are expected to have a proactive bias in
driving strategic change when performance is poor. Since they are not threatened by uncertain and challenging
situations, such as deteriorating performance, these CEOs display a willingness to accept and endorse
alternative courses of action, are capable of devising effective solutions to problems, and are better equipped to
deal with the challenges associated with strategic change. In addition, such CEOs would be more likely to
challenge comforting, but sometimes unrealistic, interpretations of firm performance held by the board or top
management team (Drummond, 2015). These arguments extend previous research that has found a strong
negative association between ambiguity tolerance and resistance to change (e.g. Oreg, 2003). Similarly, Judge et
al. (1999) found that ambiguity tolerance was among the two psychological traits most strongly associated with
executives’ ability to cope with change. Indeed, while CEOs less tolerant of ambiguity may wait for significant
performance drops before initiating changes, CEOs with higher ambiguity tolerance will be more likely to initiate
change once firm performance dips below aspirations.
H1: Ambiguity tolerance will moderate the relationship between negative attainment discrepancy and
strategic change, such that CEOs with higher ambiguity tolerance will initiate greater strategic change
when performance is slightly below aspirations.

Cognitive complexity and firm responses to performance shortfalls

Prior literature considers that cognitively complex executives are able to envision and execute a wider set of
possible actions because they are minimally constrained by their intellectual aptitude, critical thinking skills, and
perceptive abilities. Cognitive complexity suggests an executive’s capacity to seek, differentiate, and integrate
information (Hogarth, 1980); consider abstract ideas (Neuliep and Hazelton, 1986); and recognize and
comprehend a wider range of perspectives when making decisions (McGill et al., 1994; Van Seggelen-Damen,
2013). Scholars have argued that cognitively complex executives excel at strategic planning and formulation
because they can adapt to changing environments by continually filtering and processing new information and
reevaluating goals and strategies (Hambrick et al., 1996; McGill et al., 1994). This ability to draw on an extensive
range of information and personal evaluation skills, as well as greater information processing skills, has been
shown to be positively associated with strategic thinking. Outcomes from strategic thinking associated with
cognitive complexity include speedier and higher quality evaluation of options during strategic or operational
planning (Hitt and Tyler, 1991), increased speed and quality for acquisition decisions (Wally and Baum, 1994),
and a leader’s performance relative to innovation (Halbesleben et al., 2003; Zander and Kogut, 1995). Indeed,
recent research has shown that cognitive complexity is one of the most critical personal competencies necessary
for implementing strategic change (Crossland et al., 2014) and sustaining higher performance in dynamic
environments (Latukha and Panibratov, 2015).
This study extends previous theory and research that links cognitive complexity and proactive behavior by
arguing that, in cases of poor performance, cognitively complex CEOs will be better suited to comprehend
changes in the internal and external environment and, in turn, be able to conceptualize and drive the necessary
changes in their firm’s strategies and actions. CEOs’ proactive behavior will be driven by an honest and more
accurate assessment of current strategies and a deeper understanding of their firm’s businesses and how
various internal functions are associated with current strategies and serving customers’ needs.
H2: Cognitive complexity will moderate the relationship between negative attainment discrepancy and
strategic change, such that CEOs with greater cognitive complexity will initiate greater strategic change
when performance falls farther below aspirations.

Locus of control and firm responses to performance shortfalls

Levenson (1974) refers to locus of control as the ability of individuals to differentiate between internality,
powerful others, and external events, while Rotter (1966) and Judge et al. (1999) assert that locus of control is
an individual’s perception of his or her ability to exercise control over the environment. People who believe that
their knowledge, skills, abilities, and actions have a strong influence on outcomes in their personal and
professional lives are “internals.” Conversely, those who believe that outcomes in their personal and
professional lives are controlled by forces beyond their control are considered “externals” (Hodgkinson, 1992).
Scholars have found positive relationships for CEOs having an internal locus of control with firm performance
(Boone et al., 1996) and with developing their staff and inspiring them to accept a higher collective purpose
(Howell and Avolio, 1993). Similarly, evidence suggests that “internal” CEOs take greater risks, pursue more
innovation, and are less likely to imitate competitors (Miller et al., 1982) and that locus of control moderates the
relationship between experience and decision maker uncertainty (Ashill and Jobber, 2013).
CEOs with a more internal locus of control, contrary to CEOs who more strongly feel that outcomes from their
decisions and actions are related to exogenous events (i.e. “externals”), should be more proactive in taking
actions to address poor performance. Indeed, CEOs with an “internal” predisposition are predicted to have a
greater sense of urgency to initiate actions when performance is poor and will generate a broader range of
initiatives to address problems because they feel that the actions they initiate and promote will drive firm
outcomes.
H3: Locus of control will moderate the relationship between negative attainment discrepancy and
strategic change, such that CEOs with a greater internal locus of control will initiate greater strategic
change when performance falls farther below aspirations.

CSQ and firm responses to performance shortfalls

CEOs who are more committed to the status quo have developed psychological investments in the current
policies of their firm, along with a personal need to adhere to established industry norms (Hambrick et al.,
1993). These psychological investments have previously been found to be caused by functional experience in
dominant career tracks (Geletkanycz and Black, 2001), CEO industry tenure (Hambrick et al., 1993), and CEO firm
tenure (Musteen et al., 2006), though mixed results from studies examining the relationship between past firm
performance and CSQ (see McClelland et al., 2010) suggest that a combination of inertial pressures and
psychological investments leads to a CEO being more committed to the status quo. CEO CSQ has been found to
exhibit a positive effect on performance in low discretion industries, while having a negative effect on
performance in high discretion industries (McClelland et al., 2010). Additionally, scholars have theorized that
CSQ inhibits organizational evolution (Tushman et al., 1986), with studies showing that, if the CEO is newly
appointed, CSQ inhibits his or her ability to pursue change (Nakauchi and Wiersema, 2015). As CSQ is an
enduring and often excessive belief in the firm’s current policies and strategies, the following hypothesis that
CEOs who are more committed to the status quo will knowingly or unknowingly react less urgently to poor
performance is offered.
H4: CSQ will moderate the relationship between negative attainment discrepancy and strategic change,
such that CEOs who are more committed to the status quo will initiate less strategic change when
performance falls slightly below aspirations.

Methods
Sample

The sample was drawn from 1017 publicly traded US firms across 28 states1 in which the firm had been in
existence before 2010 and had 2014 revenue greater than 20 million dollars. These firms operate in a wide
range of industries, in which there is a substantial variation in competitive dynamics, financial and market
performance, and life cycle stage. Questionnaires were sent to the 1017 CEOs, asking them to respond to 32
items associated with ambiguity tolerance, cognitive complexity, locus of control, and CSQ. One hundred seven
completed questionnaires were received from the CEOs, resulting in a 10.5% response rate that is consistent
with expected response rates from CEOs of large US firms (Hambrick et al., 1993). Eight of the 107 firms with
responding CEOs were either acquired, went bankrupt shortly after the response was received, or operated in
industries in which this study’s dependent variable measure was not appropriate (e.g. banking, insurance). Thus,
the final sample size was 99 publicly traded US firms.
The age of the 99 CEOs in the sample ranges from 43 years to 80 years, with an average age of 57.5 years.
Twenty-one CEOs hold degrees from elite educational institutions,2 while five CEOs are female, 17 CEOs are one
of their firm’s founders, and four CEOs have family members serving on the top management team. For the 99
CEOs, the median 2014 current compensation is US$715,000 and their median 2014 total compensation is
US$2,590,000. The median ratio of CEOs’ current compensation to their firm’s next highest paid executive is
1.59.

Dependent variable

Following prior research, strategic change is measured as the change in six key strategic choice variables:
advertising intensity; R&D intensity; selling, general and administrative intensity; capital intensity; plant,
property, and equipment (PP&E) newness; and leverage (Crossland et al., 2014). For each firm in the sample, the
absolute values of the six strategic choice variables from 2014 to 2015 were calculated. Each strategic choice
variable was then standardized. The six resulting measures were then averaged, providing a positive value in
which higher scores indicate greater strategic change.

Independent variable

Attainment discrepancy was operationalized as the difference between firm performance in year 2014 and its
aspiration levels (based on firm performance in year 2013). Performance is based on industry-adjusted market
return, which is derived by calculating shareholder equity divided by total assets for each firm and then
subtracting the mean market return of all firms in its industry. Consistent with previous BTOF research that
examines attainment discrepancies (Greve, 2003; Iyer and Miller, 2008), a spline function was used to create
positive attainment discrepancy (i.e. market return above aspirations) and negative attainment discrepancy
(i.e. market return below aspirations). Thus, for positive attainment discrepancy, if industry-adjusted market
return is greater than zero, then market return above aspirations equals industry-adjusted market return;
otherwise, market return above aspirations is set to zero. Likewise, for negative attainment discrepancy, if
industry-adjusted market return is equal to or less than zero, then market return below aspirations equals
industry-adjusted market return; otherwise, market return below aspirations is set to zero.

Moderator variables

Responses from questionnaires were used to develop the measures for the four moderator variables.
For ambiguity tolerance, CEOs responded to a 13-item five-point Likert-type scale developed by McLain
(2009) (see Table 1A for a list of the items). In developing his ambiguity tolerance scale, McLain paid close
attention to how each item was worded, reducing potential confounding influences of references not related to
the CEOs role. Furnham and Marks (2013) reviewed ambiguity tolerance scales dating back to Budner (1962) and

recommended using McLain’s scale when participants are less likely to respond to longer scales or may be
cognitively overloaded.
The responses from CEOs indicated strong internal consistency (α = 0.84), in line with the internal consistency
found by McLain during testing with various groups of subjects. Ambiguity tolerance for each responding CEO
was calculated by adjusting the reverse-coded items and computing the mean of the 13 equally weighted items.
Since ambiguity tolerance represents a psychological trait that is firmly established by the time executives
assume the CEO role and, thus, remains stable over time (Judge et al., 2009; Roberts et al., 2006), it is unlikely
that the current strategic posture and performance of the firm have influenced the CEOs’ responses.
Cognitive complexity was derived from the number of functions that a CEO reported working in during his or her
career. Career variety, whether it is defined as firms, industries, or distinct functions in which a CEO has worked
during his or her career, enables a greater awareness of connections and impacts. Even if the CEO did not
master a specific function (e.g. accounting, engineering, manufacturing), having worked in that function
enhances the CEOs ability to conceptualize business situations and promote a wider array of solutions due to a
more extensive cognitive stock (Crossland et al., 2014; Fiske and Taylor, 2013). Responding CEOs reported
working in as few as two functions and as many as nine functions during their careers. Because tests for
skewness and kurtosis revealed a positive skew, the log of reported career functions was used for the cognitive
complexity measure in the analysis.
For locus of control, CEOs responded to Hodgkinson’s (1992) established 16-item five-point Likert-type scale
(see Table 2A for a list of the items). Hodgkinson’s scale is a more strategically oriented locus of control scale
that is appropriate for studies of executives of for-profit firms because of its context specificity and no
correlation with social desirability (Hiller and Hambrick, 2005). CEOs’ responses to the 16 items indicated strong
internal consistency (α = 0.73). Locus of control for each responding CEO was calculated by adjusting the
reverse-coded items and computing the mean of the 16 equally weighted items. The composite scores ranged
from 1 to 5, with higher scores indicating a more internal locus of control.
For CSQ, CEOs responded to a single reverse-coded item, “I can tolerate strategic and operational changes that
are risky if they can potentially improve the performance of our firm,” with scores ranging from 1 to 5 and
higher scores indicating greater CSQ.

Control variables

CEO tenure has been found to be positively associated with CEO influence over firm decisions (Musteen et al.,
2006) and has been argued to be negatively associated with strategic change (Miller, 1991). Thus, CEO tenure,
measured as the log of the number of years that the CEO has served in his or her role in the firm, was included
as a control variable. Management scholars have long held the view that as firm size increases, significant
inertial forces develop within firms (Thompson, 1967). Larger firms are more likely to have extensive
bureaucracy (Mintzberg, 1978) and difficulty implementing change (Aldrich, 2008). Thus, firm size, measured as
the log of average sales from 2013 to 2015, was included as a control variable. To control for the influence of
larger institutional shareholders over firm actions, blockholder share, calculated as the total percentage of
shares held by institutions that own at least five percent of the firm’s outstanding shares, was included in the
analysis. Additionally, since the volatility of the firm’s industry may influence the degree of strategic change, the
analysis controlled for industry dynamism. Following the method of Dess and Beard (1984) to measure industry
dynamism, standard error was calculated from regressing 5 years of annual industry sales on a year counter
variable. Furthermore, to control for other sources of power and possible mandates for change, whether the
CEO was also a founder of the firm, held the title of board chairman (i.e. CEO duality), and had joined the firm
within 12 months of attaining the CEO position (i.e. outsider) were included in the analysis. In each of these

three cases, the variable was coded as “1” if true for the CEO; otherwise, it was coded as “0.” Finally, consistent
with prior BTOF research, positive attainment was included as an additional control variable.
To increase confidence that the results reflect causal relationships, the measurements of all independent and
control variables are from the year prior to assessing strategic change.

Analysis
Methods summarized in Datta (1991) were followed to test for potential nonresponse and late response bias,
with the results showing no such problems in the sample. Descriptive statistics, including means, standard
deviations, and correlations, are reported in Table 1. The correlations do not suggest that collinearity is a
problem, which was verified by determining the variance inflation factor (VIF) for each independent variable. VIF
did not exceed 1.47 for any independent variable.

Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlations.
Mean

Standard
deviation

Minim
um

Maxi
mum

1

1. Strategic
change
2. CEO tenure
3. Firm size

0.34

0.39

0.00

2.30

0.79
8.95

0.39
0.59

0.00
7.67

1.51
10.56

4. Founder

0.17

0.38

0

1

-0.050
0.245*
0.066

5. CEO
duality
6. Outsider
7.
Blockholder
share
8. Industry
dynamism
9. Market
return above
aspirations
10. Market
return below
aspirations

0.42

0.50

0

1

-0.002

0.37
0.35

0.49
0.18

0
0.00

1
0.84

0.143
0.066

0.03

0.05

0.00

0.46

0.08

0.11

0.00

-0.06

0.12

11. Ambiguity
tolerance

3.74

12. Cognitive
complexity

2

3

4

5

6

-0.156
-0.084

0.118

7

8

9

10

11

12

-0.134
0.449*
*
0.381*
*
-0.144
0.236*

-0.155

-0.169
-0.065

0.368*
*
-0.186
-0.164

-0.040

0.025

0.146

0.003

0.153

-0.057

-0.023

0.065

0.084

0.50

-0.143

0.145

0.055

-0.012

-0.088

-0.082

-0.70

0.00

0.269*
*

-0.059

0.084

-0.010

-0.021

-0.095

-0.163

-0.064

0.365*
*

0.49

2.54

4.85

0.133

0.029

0.111

-0.099

0.088

0.166

-0.011

-0.041

-0.093

0.173

1.50

0.37

0.69

2.20

0.187

-0.062

-0.040

0.110

0.073

0.231*
-

0.064

0.012

0.025

0.012

-0.109

13. Locus of
control

3.69

0.38

2.69

4.69

-0.106

0.005

0.047

-0.109

-0.035

0.280*
*

0.061

0.047

0.004

0.067

0.301**

0.165

14. CSQ

1.96

0.79

1.00

5.00

0.200*

0.251*

-0.070

-0.078

-0.137

0.013

0.110
-

-0.038

0.072

0.136

-0.351**

0.146

Note: CSQ: commitment to the status quo. N
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.

99.

13

-0.020

-0.162

The hypotheses were tested using ordinary least squares regressions, with results from testing the four
hypotheses shown in Table 2. While no specific problems were seen in the data, robust standard errors were
used since they offer a more conservative measure of standard errors that can deal more effectively with minor
problems regarding normality, outliers, and heteroscedasticity (Rousseeuw and Leroy, 2005). Supplementary
analyses controlled for CEO gender, CEO age, CEO current compensation, and the ratio of CEO current
compensation to his or her firm’s next highest paid executive. Since those variables were not significant and did
not change the results, they were not included in Table 2.

Table 2. Analysis using OLS regression.
Dependent variable: strategic
change
Variables
CEO tenure
Firm size
Blockholder share
Industry dynamism
Founder
Duality
Outsider
Market return above
aspirations
Market return below
aspirations
Ambiguity tolerance
Cognitive complexity

Model 1
-0.106
(0.104)
-0.147¹
(0.087)
0.068
(0.346)
0.099
(0.188)
0.014
(0.083)
0.085
(0.100)
-0.006
(0.312)

Model 2
-0.132
(0.104)
-0.139
(0.090)
-0.030
(0.340)
0.100
(0.188)
0.015
(0.082)
0.069
(0.097)
-0.157
(0.259)
-0.038
(0.266)
-0.832¹
(0.434)

Model 3
-0.139
(0.103)
-0.152
(0.093)
-0.017
(0.340)
0.117
(0.188)
0.000
(0.086)
0.051
(0.100)
-0.075
(0.328)
-0.034
(0.262)
-0.762
(0.468)
0.096
(0.078)

Model 4
-0.132
(0.105)
-0.145
(0.090)
-0.061
(0.336)
0.102 (0.187)
0.036 (0.082)
0.033 (0.099)
-0.488
(0.332)
0.173 (0.273)
-8.132***
(2.345)
0.230*
(0.088)

Locus of control

Model 5
-0.106
(0.095)
-0.140
(0.091)
0.002
(0.339)
0.071
(0.174)
0.002
(0.079)
0.035
(0.085)
-0.174
(0.257)
-0.037
(0.278)
-0.842*
(0.398)

Model 6
-0.185¹
(0.105)
-0.118
(0.091)
-0.085
(0.292)
0.046
(0.150)
0.066
(0.078)
0.035
(0.085)
-0.255
(0.263)
0.131
(0.258)
3.018*
(1.149)

0.163
(0.122)

-0.056
(0.104)

CSQ
Interactions
Market return below
aspirations × Ambiguity
tolerance
Market return below
aspirations × Cognitive
complexity
Market return below
aspirations × Locus of control
Market return below
aspirations x CSQ

Model 7
-0.120
(0.106)
-0.133
(0.084)
-0.016
(0.341)
0.092
(0.182)
0.015
(0.082)
0.093
(0.103)
-0.114
(0.266)
-0.042
(0.271)
-0.795¹
(0.463)

Model 8
-0.127
(0.106)
-0.132
(0.083)
-0.029
(0.347)
0.079
(0.185)
0.023
(0.079)
0.103
(0.105)
-0.050
(0.310)
0.025
(0.278)
2.339
(3.037)

-0.102
(0.130)

-0.174
(0.157)

Model 9
-0.186
(0.114)
-0.155¹
(0.088)
0.007
(0.334)
0.109
(0.181)
0.004
(0.079)
0.062
(0.093)
-0.152
(0.269)
-0.009
(0.262)
-0.738¹
(0.426)

Model 10
-0.185
(0.117)
-0.154¹
(0.088)
0.009
(0.331)
0.113
(0.172)
0.003
(0.081)
0.064
(0.092)
-0.162
(0.276)
-0.012
(0.261)
-0.541
(1.215)

-0.110*
(0.053)

-0.114*
(0.051)

1.776**
(0.524)
-2.794**
(0.907)
-0.899
(0.897)

-0.107
(0.667)

Constant

1.665¹
1.611¹
1.375¹
0.791 (0.743) 1.361
1.540
1.915¹
(0.851)
(0.878)
(0.783)
(0.986)
(0.971)
(1.080)
2
R
0.084
0.145
0.158
0.226
0.167
0.279
0.154
Note: CSQ: commitment to the status quo; OLS: ordinary least squares. N 99. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.
¹p< 0.01; ***p < 0.001.

2.161¹
(1.164)
0.167

2.004*
(0.895)
0.191

2.004*
(0.898)
0.191

Results
Model 1 shows the results with only the control variables included in the model. Model 2 adds the
independent variables and models 3 through 10 add the moderating variables and interaction terms.
The baseline hypothesis that negative attainment discrepancy drives more strategic change is generally
supported (β = −0.832; p = 0.058 in model 2). Here, a negative coefficient for the independent
variable, market return below aspirations, indicates that firms engage in strategic change as
performance deteriorates.
Hypothesis 1 argued that ambiguity tolerance will moderate the relationship between negative
attainment discrepancy and strategic change, such that CEOs with higher ambiguity tolerance will
initiate greater strategic change when performance is slightly below aspirations. As shown in model 4,
the interaction term of ambiguity tolerance and market return below aspirations is positive and
significant (p < 0.01), providing support for hypothesis 1. This is further illustrated in Figure 1, which
shows that CEOs with higher ambiguity tolerance implement greater strategic change when
performance is slightly below aspirations. CEOs who are less tolerant of ambiguity increase the degree
of strategic change that they implement as performance deteriorates, with CEOs implementing roughly
the same degree of strategic change, regardless of their tolerance for ambiguity, when performance is
far below aspirations. This implies that a CEO with high ambiguity tolerance will react earlier to
performance downturns, which could be critical to the long-term viability of the firm. Waiting until firm
performance is significantly below aspirations could put the firm in the vicarious position of being
unable to pivot to a new course of action before it is too late.

Figure 1. Interaction of ambiguity tolerance with market return below aspirations.
Hypothesis 2 stated that cognitive complexity will moderate the relationship between negative
attainment discrepancy and strategic change, such that CEOs with higher cognitive complexity will
initiate greater strategic change when performance falls farther below aspirations. As shown in model 6,
the interaction term of cognitive complexity and market return below aspirations is significant (p < 0.01),
providing support for hypothesis 2. This is further illustrated in Figure 2, which shows that CEOs with
higher cognitive complexity increase the degree of strategic change that they implement as
performance worsens, while CEOs with less cognitive complexity implement approximately the same
degree of strategic change at all levels of performance below aspirations. The results suggest that a
CEO's cognitive complexity can also be critical to the long-term viability of the firm, but in a different
way than ambiguity tolerance. While the results suggest that greater ambiguity tolerance increases the
likelihood of initiating strategic change sooner (i.e. when performance falls slightly below aspirations),
the results also suggest that CEOs with greater cognitive complexity are more likely to implement broad

and extensive changes in many strategic dimensions (e.g. advertising, R&D investment, PP&E
investment, leverage) when performance falls far below aspirations.

Figure 2. Interaction of cognitive complexity with market return below aspirations.
Hypothesis 3 stated that locus of control will moderate the relationship between negative attainment
discrepancy and strategic change. As shown in model 8, the interaction term of locus of
control with market return below aspirations is not significant. Hypothesis 3 is not supported.
Hypothesis 4 stated that CSQ will moderate the relationship between negative attainment discrepancy
and strategic change. As shown in model 10, the interaction term of CSQ and market return below
aspirations is not significant. Hypothesis 4 is not supported.

Discussion
This study provides insight into an overlooked element of the BTOF, that of managerial cognitions in
times of uncertainty (Greve, 2003). Thus, this study builds on BTOF by addressing the role of managerial
discretion and psychological traits on the relationship between performance and action when the firm is
performing poorly. In particular, the moderating effects of four psychological traits from Hambrick and
Finkelstein’s (1987) managerial discretion construct—ambiguity tolerance, cognitive complexity, locus of
control, and CSQ—on the relationship between negative attainment discrepancy and strategic change
were examined. The results reveal that specific executive characteristics, which influence the degree of
discretion displayed by CEOs, are important contingencies to whether and when firms engage in
strategic change. Thus, this study provides a strong support to the broad field of strategic leadership
which centers around the idea that careful choice of leaders is critical to firm behaviors.
The results from testing hypothesis 1 suggest that CEOs with greater ambiguity tolerance are more likely
to implement changes necessary to prevent further performance erosion. The psychology literature
posits that individuals with higher ambiguity tolerance are more comfortable with reversing courses of
action, are less likely to be trapped in maintaining existing routines, and are more open-minded toward
unfamiliar and unexpected external environmental changes (Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949; McLain, 2009).
Additionally, Judge et al., (1999) showed that executives who are more comfortable with ambiguity are
better able to cope with change. The results from this study suggest that each of these facets of
ambiguity tolerance may play a role in not only how CEOs interpret situations and implement actions,
but whether they choose to do so. CEOs who are less tolerant of ambiguity may delay or forego
evaluating, developing, and implementing alternative strategic directions.
Further, the results from testing hypothesis 2 show that CEOs with greater cognitive complexity
implement more substantial changes as performance declines, potentially in a wider range of strategic

areas than CEOs with lower cognitive complexity. Consistent with the idea of bounded rationality
(March and Simon, 1958), these results suggest that regardless of the situation’s severity, some CEOs
might be limited in the degree of change they can undertake because of their knowledge and ability to
comprehend and adapt to various internal and external conditions. Restrictions on strategic change
implemented by a CEO with lower cognitive complexity when performance is very poor may be the
result of a series of additive limitations, since reduced cognitive complexity may constrain a CEOs field of
vision and cause a CEO to be selective or biased when interpreting information. Additionally, a CEOs
knowledge of alternatives and consequences of potential alternatives may also be constrained. While a
few management scholars have examined the relationship of cognitive complexity with strategic
choices, such as acquisitions (Hitt and Tyler, 1991) and the pace of decision-making (Wally and Baum,
1994), this study advances prior research by demonstrating that cognitive complexity serves to bolster
strategic change when performance falls far short of expectations.
Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) posit that both cognitive complexity and ambiguity tolerance are
positively related to managerial discretion. In the context of a firm performing below board and
shareholder aspirations, these findings are consistent with how these two traits function in Hambrick
and Finkelstein’s managerial characteristics force. These findings, however, also suggest that ambiguity
tolerance and cognitive complexity are especially valuable in different circumstances. First, consider a
firm that has consistently met performance expectations, but is currently experiencing a small
performance decline. A CEO with less ambiguity tolerance might “stay the course.” However, a CEO who
is more tolerant of ambiguity is far more proactive and takes any necessary steps and makes changes to
avoid further decline. Second, consider a firm that is performing considerably poorer than other firms in
its industry. Customers may be dissatisfied and, thus, are switching to other providers, costs may be too
high due to inefficiencies, and business development opportunities may be forsaken. The necessity for
change is abundantly clear, but the degree of change necessary for dramatic turnaround requires a CEO
who can conceptualize the nature of problems in most, if not all, of the firm’s activities. However,
conceptualization across many areas of the firm is not enough for turnaround. To implement dramatic
strategic change, the CEO needs to be able to comprehend and accept sweeping changes associated
with assets, management, and financial restructuring. Stated differently, the firm is better suited with a
CEO who possesses greater cognitive complexity.
Given that previous research has found that CEOs with an internal locus of control will feel that their
actions matter (Judge et al., 1999) and are more likely to trigger improvement and other positive
outcomes (Anderson and Schneier, 1978; Howell and Avolio, 1993), it was surprising that locus of
control was not found to have any effect on the relationship of performance below aspirations and
strategic change. One possible explanation is that more “external” CEOs may have self-selected more
inertial firms (e.g. older, larger) or slower-paced, less dynamic industries that are more consistent with
where they fall on the locus of control continuum (Finkelstein et al., 2009).
While no support was found for the moderating role of CSQ, the results showed a significant negative
relationship for CSQ with strategic change. This is consistent with Hambrick et al.’s (1993) position that
personal investment and strong belief in the correctness of current policies are positively associated
with CSQ. But findings from Hambrick et al. suggest that CSQ is influenced by whether the firm operates
in a low or high discretion industry, a notion further advanced by McClelland et al., (2010), who found
that high CSQ CEOs are associated with better firm performance in low discretion industries and far
worse performance in high discretion industries. Given that this study’s sample spans a wide variety of

low, medium, and high discretion industries, it may be necessary to examine firms with similar industrylevel discretion to gain visibility to how performance below aspirations interacts with CSQ.

Limitations
While this study builds on previous theory and uses established measures for most constructs, it has
limitations. First, four psychological traits were measured using CEOs’ responses to questionnaires.
While McLain (2009) and Hodgkinson (1992) worded items in their scales to reduce confounding
influences found in psychological scales related and unrelated to management, there is still the potential
for social desirability bias. CEOs may wish to be perceived as more open to alternative views and
embracing novel and unclear situations, even if this is contrary to their psychological makeup. The
method used for measuring cognitive complexity, CEOs reporting the number of functions that they
have worked in during their careers, is less susceptible to social desirability bias, though there is some
potential for CEOs to want to be perceived as having experience in more functional areas than they have
worked.
Second, the measures of cognitive complexity and CSQ use a single response to proxy for each
psychological construct. These limitations are the result of the authors’ efforts to achieve a higher
response rate, which required minimizing the number of items in the questionnaire. A more
comprehensive scale for cognitive complexity, such as Bieri’s (1966) 100-item scale, might be ideal, but
would create validity problems due to CEOs’ unwillingness to complete the questionnaire and lack of
attention span when completing long questionnaires. Thus, the scales and items used in the
questionnaire represent a compromise between length and depth. Still, in the case of cognitive
complexity, relying on the number of functions that the CEO has worked during his or her career
captures his or her functional expertise and skills of evaluating business problems and solutions
(Dearborn and Simon, 1958; Waller et al., 1995).
Third, the ability to generalize this study’s findings to other contexts may be limited. As this study uses
only publicly traded firms based in the United States, the results may not apply to privately held firms,
family firms, or firms outside the United States. However, because the participating CEOs are from over
60 different industries, the findings are not constrained to a specific industry.

Practical implications
Strategic change is necessary for firms to reverse poor performance or find new sources of competitive
advantage. As the results from this study suggest, managerial discretion influences when and to what
degree CEOs implement strategic change. Faced with the same situation, some CEOs will implement
strategic change to try and improve performance, while others may pursue limited strategic changes or
delay any change until performance falls far below aspirations. CEOs with higher ambiguity tolerance are
more likely to implement strategic change early in response to performance downturns, while CEOs with
greater cognitive complexity are more likely to implement more comprehensive and far-reaching
strategic change in response to consistently deteriorating performance. With respect to the market for
managerial talent, executives (and management teams) who are pre-dispositioned to strategically
maneuver through firm-specific and industry-wide economic downturns will likely have a greater impact
on future outcomes or, as seen during the financial crisis, perhaps even the viability of the firm itself. A
board selecting or deciding whether to retain a CEO should emphasize whether the executive’s

personality profile is appropriate, as this is likely to influence the firm’s strategic change agenda and, in
turn, the firm’s long-term performance.
It is the authors’ sincere hope that this study serves to kindle scholarly interest in how managerial
characteristics influence firm-level strategic behaviors. For example, gender and racially diverse boards
and top management teams may be associated with greater ambiguity tolerance and cognitive
complexity, which, in turn, could promote strategic variety and change. These characteristics could also
serve as moderators between attainment discrepancy and strategic change as diverse upper echelons,
by their very nature, may attract executives who are more tolerant of ambiguity and have greater
cognitive complexity. In addition, exploration of how managerial characteristics, such as cognitive
complexity and ambiguity tolerance, impact other elements of firm strategy (e.g. innovation,
diversification, acquisitions, competitive aggressiveness) could provide insights to boards regarding
potential successor CEOs and next generation leaders who may be more likely to undertake the various
strategic initiatives the board deems essential to firm success. By systematically examining a given firm’s
human and behavioral capital, it may be possible to glean new insights into the multiple drivers of firm
initiatives and outcomes.
Appendix 1
Table 1A. Ambiguity tolerance item list (from McLain, 2009).
Item
1. I don’t tolerance ambiguous situations well.
2. I would rather avoid solving a problem that must be viewed from several different perspectives.
3. I try to avoid situations that are ambiguous.
4. I prefer familiar situations to new ones.
5. Problems that cannot be considered from just one point of view are a little threatening.
6. I avoid situations that are too complicated for me to easily understand.
7. I am tolerant of ambiguous situations.
8. I enjoy tackling problems that are complex enough to be ambiguous.
9. I try to avoid problems that don’t seem to have only one ‘‘best’’ solution.
10. I generally prefer novelty over familiarity.
11. I dislike ambiguous situations.
12. I find it hard to make a choice when the outcome is uncertain.
13. I prefer a situation in which there is some ambiguity.
Note: Items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, and 11 are reverse-scored.

Appendix 2
Table 2A. Locus of control item list (from Hodgkinson, 1992).
Item
1. There is little my company can do in order to change the ‘‘rules of competition’’ in our industry.
2. Many of the problems experienced by businesses can be avoided through careful planning and
analysis.
3. To a great extent the competitive environment in which my company operates is shaped by
forces beyond its control.
4. Becoming a successful company is a matter of creating opportunities, luck has little or nothing
to do with it.
5. There is little point in the majority of companies taking an active interest in the wider concerns of
their industry because only the larger more powerful companies have any real influence.
6. It is not always wise to make strategic plans far ahead because many things may turn out to be a
matter of good or bad fortune anyhow.
7. My company can pretty much accomplish whatever it sets out to achieve.
8. Most companies can have an influence in shaping the structure of the market.
9. In regards to competing in the market place, most companies are the victims of forces they
cannot control.
10. There is little point in engaging in detailed strategic analyses and planning because often events
occur that my company cannot control.
11. Usually companies fail because they have not taken advantage of their opportunities.
12. My company is able to influence the basis upon which it competes with other firms.
13. Businesses who rarely experience strategic problems are just plain lucky.
14. There is a direct connection between the interest you take in your competitors’ businesses and
the success of your own company.
15. My company has a direct role in shaping the environment in which it competes.
16. Market opportunities in my industry are largely predetermined by factors beyond my
company’s control.
Note: Items 2, 4, 7, 8, 11, 12, 14, and 15 are reverse-scored.
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Notes

1.CEOs were included who were more likely to be familiar with or personally connected to the home
university of one of the authors. A 750-mile radius from that author’s home university to firms’
headquarters was necessary to create a mailing list of CEOs from at least 1000 firms. This
methodology is consistent with previous research showing that response rates can be increased
when targeted respondents have a personal or geographic affinity to the researcher’s institution
(Knight et al., 1999). While the generalizability of any sample population is limited, prior

research supports the position that proximity does not limit the ability to generalize results for
the entire set of public firms in the United States (Smith et al., 1994).
2.See Finkelstein (1992) for the list of elite educational institutions.
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